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Justice Thomas' Kelo Dissent, or, "History as a Grab Bag of
Principles"*
David L. Breau**
I. INTRODUCTION

In Kelo v. City of New London,' a bare majority of the Supreme Court of the
United States held that economic development-creating jobs and increasing tax
revenues-satisfies the Fifth Amendment's requirement that property be "taken
for public use."2 Kelo ignited substantial political backlash,3 probably because the
Court's decision permitted a city to use eminent domain to forcibly acquire
homes from residents who had lived in them for decades.4 The Court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that taking their property for economic development was not
a "public use," explaining that ever since the Court "began applying the Fifth
Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader
and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose."' 5 Although
Justice Stevens' majority opinion was the subject of much criticism,' Justice
Thomas' dissent was probably the most radical of the four opinions in Kelo.7
Thomas would have interpreted the Public Use Clause according to what he
labels its "most natural reading," namely, as a substantive limitation that "allows
•

dissenting).
Lucas v.S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1060 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,

•* Law Clerk, The Honorable Stanley Marcus, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
2006-2007; J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2006; B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1998. The author
would like to thank Jedediah Purdy for his valuable insights, constructive criticism, and boundless patience
during the writing of this article. The author would also like to thank Neil Siegel for his helpful suggestions
while editing this article.
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See T.R. Reid, Missouri Condemnation No Longer So Imminent; Supreme Court Ruling Ignites
Political Backlash, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at A2 ("[A]ll over the country .... Kelo.. . has sparked a
furious reaction, with politicians of both parties proposing new legislation that would sharply limit the kind of
seizure the... decision validated."); see, e.g., Jeff Jacoby, Editorial, Eminent Injustice in New London, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 26, 2005, at Dl 1 ("'These five justices,' [said the son of one of the Kelo plaintiffs,] 'I hope
someone looks at their property and says, "You know, we could put that land to better use why don't we get the
town to take it from them by eminent domain." Then maybe they would understand what they're putting my
father through."'); Benjamin Weyl, Activist Tries a Grab for Jurist's Property, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at
A10 (describing an activist's apparently serious suggestion that the City of Weare, New Hampshire use eminent
domain to acquire Justice Souter's vacation home to build a new hotel).
4. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
5. Id. at 480.
6. In addition to the negative popular reaction, see supra note 3, some of the legal criticisms of Kelo are
expressed by Justice O'Connor's dissent and by the opinion of the dissenting justices in the case when it was
decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. See id. at 494-505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Kelo v. City of
New London, 843 A.2d 500, 588 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., dissenting).
7. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Justice Kennedy also wrote a separate concurring opinion. The principle dissent was written by Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice Thomas wrote a separate
dissent, which no other Justice joined, that is the subject of this article.
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the government to take property only if the government owns, or the public has a
legal right to use, the property. ' In Thomas' view, the majority opinion
unjustifiably "replaces the Public Use Clause with a Public Purpose Clause" or a
"'Diverse and Always Evolving Needs of Society' Clause." 9
In the first half of his opinion, Justice Thomas makes three interrelated
arguments to support his position that a narrow reading of the Public Use Clause
is consistent with its "original meaning."' First, Thomas begins with a textual
analysis of the words "for public use," considering the definition of "use" in a
founding-era dictionary and comparing the Public Use Clause to other clauses in
the United States Constitution and in several contemporary constitutions."
Second, the opinion examines the "Constitution's common-law background,"2
which Thomas believes "reinforces" the conclusions of his textual analysis.'
Perhaps not surprisingly, Thomas almost exclusively relies on the writings of
William Blackstone for this "common-law background."' 3 Finally, Thomas
surveys the early states' eminent domain practices and explains how these
practices4 support his understanding of the original meaning of the Public Use
Clause.'
The second half of Thomas' dissent advocates reconsidering the Court's
entire public use jurisprudence to conform with the conclusions of his textual and
historical analysis. He begins with the earliest federal cases, decided over a
century ago, that suggested the term "public use" should be broadly construed
and argues that imprecise dicta in those early cases evolved into the holdings of
later key cases such as Berman v. Parker'6 and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff. 7 In both of these cases, the Court unanimously held that the Public Use
Clause is satisfied by a legislature's determination that taken property will be
used for a public purpose,'" and the majority opinion in Kelo is based in large part
on the reasoning of cases such as Berman and Midkiff.'9

8. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 506 (quoting id. at 479 (majority opinion)).
10. Id. at 508-14.
11. Id. at508-10.
12. Id. at510.
13. Id. at 505, 508, 510 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
134-35 (1765)).
14. Id. at 511-14. Because the federal government did not exercise its eminent domain authority until
many decades after its founding, this early practice concerns the states' eminent domain activity and the limits
imposed by state equivalents of the Takings Clause. Id. at 511-12. The first major case conceming an exercise
of eminent domain by the federal government was not decided until 1876. DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY,
POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 55 (1992) (referencing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876)).
15. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514-23.
16. 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954).
17. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
18. Id. at 242; Berman, 348 U.S. at 36.
19. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480-86 (majority opinion) (discussing Berman and Midkiff and concluding that
there is "no principled way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes" recognized
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This article analyzes the first half of Thomas' dissent because it provides the
fundamental reasoning behind his view that the Public Use Clause should be
interpreted as it was "originally understood," and his opinion of the significance
of the facts in Kelo-and of the precedent on which his dissent is basedessentially follow from that fundamental reasoning. This article does not take
issue with the "original meaning" inquiry as a method of deciding constitutional
cases or the propriety of overruling a century of Supreme Court precedent based
on historical conclusions of questionable accuracy. Instead, it examines the
support that Justice Thomas provides for the proposition that the Public Use
Clause was originally understood as a substantive limitation that allowed a taking
"only if the government or the public actually uses the taken property., 20 This
article argues that Justice Thomas' understanding of the Public Use Clause's
original meaning is merely one possible meaning that the Framers may have had
in mind and that at least as much historical and textual evidence exists to support
the view that the Framers intended the government to be able to take private
property for public purposes such as economic development. 2' The discussion in
this article draws on the scholarship of William Novak,22 Gregory Alexander,23
David Schultz,2' Morton Horwitz, 25 and others to demonstrate that many of the
historical sources that Justice Thomas relies on-particularly John Lewis' 1888
treatise on eminent domain 2 6-in fact support the conclusion that the words "for
public use" were originally understood to allow the government to take private
property for a public purpose; indeed, it is doubtful if those words were meant as
a substantive limitation at all.27

in those cases). Interestingly, although Justice O'Connor authored the opinion for the Court in Midkiff, she
authored the principle dissent in Kelo.
20. Id. at 514-17 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas alternates between requiring the public to "actually
use the taken property" and requiring the public have "a legal right to use" the property. See id. at 508, 514,
516, 521. In some of the early state cases that Thomas relies upon, the public actually used the taken property
unaccompanied by a formal legal right, while in other early cases he cites, there was merely a legal right to use
the property but, in actuality, the taken property was used only by private parties. See id. at 512-13, 515-16
(discussing Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1906)). Accordingly, it would
seem that Thomas would allow either legal or actual use to satisfy the Public Use Clause. See infra notes 144-48
and accompanying text.
21. For a brief overview of the variety of influences on eminent domain theory and practice, see
generally Harry N. Scheiber, The Jurisprudence-andMythology-of Eminent Domain in American Legal
History, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT 217 (Ellen Paul Frankel & Howard Dickman eds., 1989).
22. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE (1992).
23. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY (1996).
24. See SCHULTZ, supra note 14.
25. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
26. See JOHN LEWIS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1888).
27. The dispute among the Justices in Kelo concerns two related issues. The first is about the correct
meaning of the words "for public use," and the second is the extent to which the Court should defer to
legislative determinations of whether a particular taking satisfies
that substantive standard. This article focuses
on the first issue because the choice of a substantive standard logically dictates an appropriate level of
scrutiny-strict scrutiny hardly makes sense if almost any public purpose satisfies the Public Use Clause, and
extreme deference would truly be an abdication of the Court's role if the standard it was trusting the legislature
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II. JUSTICE THOMAS' TEXTUAL ARGUMENTS
Justice Thomas begins by analyzing the text of the Takings Clause itself to
support his position that the "original meaning" of the Public Use Clause "allows
the government to take property only if the government owns, or the public has a
legal right to use, the property., 2' The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's wellknown Dictionary of the English Language "defined the noun 'use' as 'the act of
employing any thing to any purpose,' ''29 and an 1888 treatise by John Lewis on
eminent domain noted that the word's Latin root, utor, means "to use, make use
of, avail one's self of, employ, apply, enjoy, etc."3 ° From these two sources,
Thomas concludes that when. property is taken pursuant to the Takings Clause,
"the government or its citizens as a whole must actually 'employ' the taken
property."'', Thomas explains that, as applied to Kelo, it "strains language" to say
the public is "'employing' the property" when "the government takes property
and gives it to a private individual and the public has no right to use the
property. 32
Regardless of whether the public will in fact have "no right" to use the
property at issue in Kelo,33 there are several reasons why the language of the
Public Use Clause does not compel the conclusion that the public must actually
employ the taken property. First, Thomas' analysis ignores a part of Johnson's
definition of the word "use," focusing on the "act of employing" rather than on
"to any purpose." Taken as a whole, Johnson's definition of "use" indicates that
"public use" could mean that the public can employ "any thing"-here, the taken
property-"to any purpose.34 Thus, the phrase "property taken for public use"
could be understood as "the act by the public of employing the taken property to
any purpose," or perhaps even as "the act of employing the taken property to a
public purpose." Given that Thomas derisively characterizes the majority opinion
as replacing the Public Use Clause with a "Public Purpose Clause,"35 it is odd that
his textual analysis begins by citing Johnson's Dictionary, which itself defines
"use" in terms of "purpose. 36 Furthermore, Johnson lists nine definitions for the

to apply was a difficult one to satisfy.
28. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 508 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
29. Id. (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2194 (4th ed. 1773)).
30. Id. (quoting LEWIS, supra note 26, at 224 n.4).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
34. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (citing 2 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 2194 (emphasis added)).
35. Id. at 506.
36. In the eminent domain context, many early state judges do not seem to have distinguished between
the words "use" and "purpose." See, e.g., Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 23-24 (N.Y.
1837) (opinion of Edwards, Sen.) (using the terms "public purposes" and "public use" interchangeably);
Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (opinion of Kent, Ch.) ("I am not to be
understood as denying a competent power in the legislature to take private property for necessary or useful
public purposes....But... a fair compensation... is a necessary qualification... in taking private property

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
word "use,"'" and Thomas does not explain why the drafters of the Fifth
Amendment must have necessarily intended the particular definition Thomas
prefers-one of many meanings that the word had during the late eighteenth
century.38
Second, regarding Thomas' reliance on Lewis' treatise, putting aside the
relevance of a treatise published in 1888 for determining the "original meaning"
of an amendment drafted in 1791,' 9 Thomas emphasizes Lewis' definition of
"use" as "employ" while ignoring broader terms such as "enjoy."40 It hardly
seems to be "against all common sense"4' to say that the public can "enjoy"
property that, though owned by a private individual, is used to improve the local
economy and create jobs. Even in 1888, the original meaning of the words "for
public use" was far from obvious-Lewis begins his section on public use by
quoting an 1876 Nevada Supreme Court decision: "No question has ever been
submitted to the courts upon which there is a greater variety and conflict of
reasoning and results than that presented as to the meaning of the words 'public
use' . . . regulating the right of eminent domain. 42

for public uses." (emphasis added)); Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 390, 420 (1818) (opinion of Daniel,
J.) (holding that the legislature can take property only for "public purposes"); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27
Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 264 (1828) (opinion of Carr, J.) ("[T]he eminent domain.., extends to the taking private
property for public purposes.").
37. See 2 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 2194-95. The copy of the 1773 edition of Johnson's A Dictionary
of the English Language at Duke University's rare book room has no page numbers and seems to have been
printed without them. Therefore, the citations here rely on the page numbers that Thomas cites in his opinion.
38. Johnson's second, fourth, and fifth definitions, respectively, are "[q]ualities that make a thing proper
for any purpose," "[a]dvantage received," and "[c]onvenience." 2 JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 2194-95. Johnson
apparently intended the order of definitions to have some significance, and he indicated that the definitions of
each word should be ordered so as "to exhibit first its natural and primitive signification," then "its
consequential meaning," and then its "metaphorical meaning." SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE PLAN OF A DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1747). For a word such as "use" that has nine definitions, order alone does not
indicate how significant or common each definition was at that time. Notably, Thomas does not mention
"[a]dvantage received," and he rejects the others by arguing that, when "read in context, the term 'public use'
possesses the narrower meaning." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509. But as is discussed below, this "context" is not as
conclusive as Thomas claims. See infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
39. See NOVAK, supra note 22, at 244-47 (noting that by the late nineteenth century, American legal
thought had undergone a dramatic transformation, repudiating the "salus populi" principle that dominated the
thinking of early nineteenth-century jurists in favor of "a heightened regard for individual right and liberty");
see also ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 322-23 (noting a decidedly non-originalist position taken by this
particular 1888 treatise).
40. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 224 n.4.
41. Thomas contrasts his position with the majority's holding in absolute terms, stating, for example,
that the Court's opinion goes "against all common sense," that "[t]he Court adopted its modem reading blindly"
and relied on "a line of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of our founding
document." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506, 514, 523. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
42. Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 400-01 (1876), quoted in LEWIS, supra
note 26, at 217.
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Third, it is questionable whether a textual analysis necessarily supports the
conclusion that the Public Use Clause is a substantive limitation on the
government's eminent domain authority. In fact, Lewis himself seems to disagree
with Thomas that the "most natural reading" of the Public Use Clause is as a
limitation:
If the intent had been to make the words "public use" a limitation, the
naturalform of the expression would have been: "Private property shall
not be taken except for public use, nor without just compensation." It is
certainly questionable whether anything more was intended by the
provision ...than as though it read, "Private property shall not4 be
3 taken
under the power of eminent domain without just compensation.
There simply is not a single "most natural reading" of the Public Use Clause,
and Justice Thomas' effort to impose one by citing an eighteenth-century
dictionary and a nineteenth-century treatise is both mistaken and misleading."
Thomas' position on the meaning of "public use" is essentially identical to
the position that Lewis believed to be the "correct" view. But although Lewis
favored the narrow meaning of "public use," he readily conceded that just as
many cases had required "actual use by the public" as had upheld exercises of
eminent domain for "public benefit or advantage." 45 Furthermore, Lewis
cautioned that "[i]f we look to our dictionaries, we find the same confusion as in
the decisions," and he noted that dictionaries define "use" to mean both "[t]he act
employing any thing for any purpose" as well as "benefit, utility, advantage. 4 6
Thus, whereas Lewis readily admits that the position he takes is not compelled by
the text, history, or precedent, 7 Thomas dispenses with such qualifications and
presents Lewis' position as if it has always been the only plausible original
understanding of the Public Use Clause.48' Although Thomas does note that the

43. LEWIS, supra note 26, at ii (first emphasis added; quotations around "public use" replace commas
and italics in the original).
44. In fact, scholars have advanced plausible theories of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause
that are at least as well-supported as, and entirely at odds with, Thomas' view. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington,
"Public Use" and the Original Understandingof the So-Called "Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245,
1298-1300 (2002) (arguing that "the phrase, 'public use' as found in the Fifth Amendment was not meant to
serve as a substantive limitation at all," but merely to distinguish takings that did not require compensation,
such as taxation and forfeiture, from expropriations for which compensation was required); Errol E. Meidinger,
The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 16-18 (1980) (discussing the
ambiguity in early state constitutions, perpetuated by the language of the Fifth Amendment, about whether the
words "for public use" signified a substantive limitation on eminent domain).
45.

LEWIS, supra note 26, at 221-24.

46. Id. at 223.
47. Id. at 221-23. In the treatise's preface, Lewis willingly explains that his position on the meaning of
"public use" is merely one possibility and modestly notes that "whether the conclusions reached by the author
are correct must be left for the reader to judge." Id. at ii.
48. See supra note 41.
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early sources to which he cites also define "use" broadly, 9 he dismisses the
possibility that the Founders intended the Public Use Clause to be understood
according to those broader meanings by explaining that when "read in context,
the term 'public use' possesses the narrower meaning."50 For "context," Thomas
compares the Takings Clause to other constitutional clauses in which the term
"use" appears (or does not appear), as well as to Takings Clauses in early state
constitutions.5 ' The word "use" appears twice in the text of the Federal
Constitution: once in Article I, section 8, and again in Article I, section 10.
Thomas argues that in both instances it clearly has a narrow, literal meaning, and
that therefore the word "use" in the Takings Clause possesses the same literal
meaning. 51
Article I, section 8 grants Congress the power "[t]o raise and support Armies,
but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years."53 Article I, section 10 states that "the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the
Treasury of the United States. 54 Contrary to Thomas' assertion, neither of these
clauses shed much light on the meaning of "for public use" in the Takings
Clause. The "use" referred to in Article I, section 8 is clearly defined by the
clause itself-i.e., the use of raising and supporting armies-so that the entire
clause means "no appropriation of money to raise and support armies shall be for
more than two years. 55 The phrase "to that use" is not so much a substantive
constitutional limitation as it is a prepositional placeholder that renders more
concise that clause's grant of power combined with a limitation on its exercise 6
Thus, rather than mandating a "narrow" reading of the word "use," Article I,
section 8 suggests that the phrase "for public use" was intended as merely a
prepositional placeholder for the governmental power that must exist for the
. In
Takings Clause to have any meaning, namely, the power of eminent domain 57
other words, the original meaning of the Takings Clause might have been "nor
shall private property be taken under the power of eminent domain without just

49. See supra note 38.
50. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 509 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 509-10.
52. Id. at 509.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.12 (emphasis added).
2 (emphasis added).
54. Id. § 10, cl.
55. Constitutional Prohibition-Appropriations for Armies, 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 105, 106 (1904).
56. Cf. id. at 106-07 (explaining that the substantive limitation in Article I, section 8 concerns the
meanings of the words "raise" and "support").
57. See Harrington, supra note 44, at 1299 (arguing that the Public Use Clause "was meant to be
descriptive, rather than prescriptive"). The term "eminent domain" does not appear in the Constitution, yet the
United States clearly possesses that power despite the lack of explicit constitutional authorization. Cf. Harvey v.
Thomas, 10 Watts 63 (Pa. 1840) (noting that Pennsylvania's right of eminent domain "would have existed in
full force without" the constitutional clause that prohibits taking property for public use without just
compensation), cited in LEWIS, supra note 26, at 22 n.4.
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compensation."58 Thus, Article I, section 8 potentially undermines a premise
critical for Thomas' position: that the Public Use Clause is a substantive
limitation on government action.5
Article I, section 10 provides that any money collected by state import taxes
"shall be for the use of the Treasury." Thus, the word "use" in this section, while
certainly meant literally, nevertheless could imply that the phrase "public use" in
the Fifth Amendment originally meant the opposite of Justice Thomas' preferred
meaning. If the Framers actually had Article I, section 10 in mind when they
chose the word "use" for the Takings Clause, then logic suggests that they would
have used a parallel formulation if their intent was to convey an identically
narrow meaning.' Specifically, just as Article I, section 10 requires that import
tax revenues "shall be for the use of the Treasury," so too, the Takings Clause
could have required that taken property "shall be for the use of the public." This
is certainly as plausible as Justice Thomas' conclusion that "use" in Article I,
section 10 mandates a literal reading of the Public Use Clause.
Thomas' next argument is based on the absence of the word "use" in another
clause. He points to the language of the General Welfare Clause, which states
that "Congress shall have the Power to... provide for the common Defense and
general Welfare,'
and suggests that the Framers would have used "for the
general welfare" in the Takings Clause if they intended its scope to be as broad.62
However, Thomas' assumption that "public use" meant something substantially
different than "general welfare" at the time of the founding may simply be
untrue. 6' Early Americans probably equated "public use" with "public benefit"64
and would not likely have drawn the sharp distinction that Thomas suggests.
Furthermore, even if the General Welfare Clause is broader than the Public Use
Clause, the literal meaning of "public use" is not the only interpretive option.
Despite the Kelo majority's deference to legislative determinations of what
constitutes public use, the issue is still subject to substantive judicial review.65 In
contrast, the general welfare limitation on congressional power is generally
considered to be effectively nonjusticiable. Thus, even if Thomas is correct that

58. This formulation paraphrases LEWIS, supra note 26, at ii; see also supra text accompanying note 43.
59. Whether the Public Use Clause is in fact such a limitation is discussed above. See supra notes 43-44
and accompanying text.
60. See Harrington, supra note 44, at 1300-01 (arguing that if Congress had intended the Public Use
Clause to be a narrow substantive limitation on eminent domain, "it might have gone about the business far
more directly").
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
62. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,509 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
63. See Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, "Public Use," and the Conundrum of OriginalIntent,
36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 74-75 (1996); Nathan Alexander Sales, Note, ClassicalRepublicanism and the Fifth
Amendment's "Public Use" Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 340-41, 340 n.10, 341 nn. 11-12 (1999).
64. See Melton, supra note 63, at 84-85; see also supranote 36.
65. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 462-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe question [of] what is a public use is
a judicial one" (quoting Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930))).
66. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987); see also Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power

380
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the distinct language in these two clauses indicates distinct meanings, this does
not necessitate the conclusion that the Framers intended "for public use" to be
read as "for actual use by the public" rather than as "for public benefit, utility, or
advantage," since the latter standard is still substantively distinct from the
standard that governs judicial review in the General Welfare Clause context.
Thomas' final contextual argument compares the phrase "public use" in the
Federal Constitution with the phrase "public exigencies" in the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights 67 and the Northwest Ordinance and with the phrase "public
necessity" in the Vermont Constitution of 1786. Thomas suggests that the words
"public use" in the Federal Constitution indicate a greater curtailment of eminent
domain than existed under these other constitutional documents. 6' However, a
closer examination of the Takings Clauses in each of these three documents
reveals that the comparison is at best inconclusive and at worst disproves
Thomas' argument.
Both the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1780, and the
Vermont Constitution of 1786 speak of "public uses" in a manner that precisely
parallels the language in the Federal Takings Clause. The Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights states that, "whenever the public exigencies require, that
the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall
receive a reasonable compensation therefor.,, 69 The Vermont Constitution of 1786
states the general principle that "private property ought to be subservient to
public uses, when necessity requires it" and then specifically provides that,
despite this subservience, "whenever any particular man's property is taken for
the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in money." 7 The
Fifth Amendment's reference to property "taken for public use" parallels the
Massachusetts reference to property "appropriated for public uses" and the
Vermont reference to property "taken for the use of the public." Thomas,
however, bases his argument on a comparison between non-parallel clauses.
These state forerunners to the Federal Takings Clause seem to suggest that
and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 197 (2001) (describing the General Welfare Clause as
"effectively nonjusticiable"); David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A
FunctionalAnalysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197,
1200 (2004) ("Dole's requirement that spending programs serve the 'general welfare' is, by the Court's own
admission, nonjusticiable."); Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear
Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 161 (2004) ("There is no
justiciable limit on the expenditure of funds.., for 'the General Welfare."'). But see David L. Breau, Note, A
New Take on Public Use: Were Kelo and Lingle Nonjusticiable?, 55 DUKE L.J. 835, 850 (2006) (arguing that
the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo line of cases has rendered the Public Use Clause effectively nonjusticiable).
67. Justice Thomas refers to this document as the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, but its full title is "A
Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." In this article, I use
"Massachusetts Declaration of Rights" because it is consistent with the original title of that document. See 1
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 337 (1971).
68. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. MAsS. CONST. art. X (1780), reprintedin I SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 341 (emphasis added).
70. VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. II (1786), reprinted in 6 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3752 (1909) (emphasis added).
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"public exigencies" or "necessity" must be a condition precedent to the exercise
of eminent domain, in addition to requiring that taken property be for public
use. 7' Thus, it could be that the omission of the "public exigencies" and
"necessity" requirements from the federal Takings Clause indicates that the
Federal Public Use Clause is less restrictive than the limitations in the Takings
Clauses of colonial Massachusetts and Vermont. 2
The Northwest Ordinance was adopted by the Continental Congress in 1787
and "was framed mainly from the laws of Massachusetts."" Its Takings Clause,
which seems to be broader than the Federal Takings Clause with respect to public
use, provides that, "should the public exigencies make it necessary for the
common preservation to take any person's property, or to demand his particular
services, full compensation shall be made for the same., 74 Similar to the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the Northwest Ordinance refers to "public
exigencies," apparently as a condition precedent for taking private property.
Unlike both the Federal Takings Clause and the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, which refer to property taken for "public use" or "public uses," the
Northwest Ordinance does not specify what is to be done with property after it
has been taken. In other words, the Northwest Ordinance simply does not contain
a clause that parallels the Federal Public Use Clause. Thus, although the addition
of the words "for public use" to the Fifth Amendment suggests that the drafters
intended some additional limitation on eminent domain, any conclusion from a
comparison with the Northwest Ordinance about the extent of that additional
limitation is little more than speculation." And, as explained above, a comparison
with the other two pre-1791 Takings Clauses suggests that the federal public use
limitation is less restrictive than the equivalent clauses in either of those
documents.

71. See Sales, supra note 63, at 367-68.
72. See id. at 368, cited in Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509-10. Thomas' citation of Sales is misleading because
Sales actually argues that the linguistic distinctions between these documents indicate that the public use
limitation in the Federal Constitution is less restrictive than the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the
Vermont Constitution, and the Northwest Ordinance. See Sales, supra note 63, at 368; see also infra text
accompanying notes 141-142. James Madison's original draft of what would become the Takings Clause read
"no person shall be... obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a
just compensation." 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 1027. If Thomas is correct that the House Committee
responsible for reviewing Madison's draft had these early state documents in mind, the deletion of any
reference to "necessity" would suggest that the House intended to broaden the federal government's power
under the amendment relative to the Takings Clauses of Massachusetts and Vermont.
73. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 386-87 (quoting an 1830 letter of Nathan Dane, who drafted the
Northwest Ordinance that was adopted by the Continental Congress).
74. Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-west of the River Ohio,
art. II (July 13, 1787), reprinted in I SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 400.
75. The Northwest Ordinance requires some public exigency to exist before a taking of property but
does not state that property, once taken, shall be put to public use. Conversely, the Federal Takings Clause does
not indicate that some public exigency must exist before property can be taken, but does say that such property
must be "taken for public use." Although one requirement logically implies the other, a comparison of the
precise phraseology used in these documents is inconclusive.
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III. "THE CONSTITUTION'S COMMON-LAW BACKGROUND"

Thomas surveys "[tlhe Constitution's common-law background" to buttress
his textual analysis that the Fifth Amendment requires the public to actually use
taken property. 6 This "common-law background" is almost entirely drawn from
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, along with a
sprinkling of that treatise's American parallel by James Kent. 7' According to
Justice Thomas,
Blackstone rejected the idea that private property could be taken solely
for purposes of any public benefit. "So great ...is the regard of the law
for private property," he explained, "that it will not authorize the least
violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole
community." He continued: "If a new road... were to be made through
the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively
beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do
this without the consent of the owner of the land." Only "by giving [the
landowner] full indemnification" could the government take property,
and even then "[t]he public [was] now considered as an individual,
treating with an individual for an exchange. 78
For Thomas it is nearly axiomatic that the Framers intended the Takings
Clause to be the constitutional embodiment of "'the law of the land [that]
postpone[s] even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of private
property.' 79
Although the Framers were undoubtedly influenced by theories about
absolute property rights,"' elevating such theories to constitutional status was not
their sole motivation." In fact, some scholars have gone so far as to call the
"American liberal tradition" little more than a myth.82 While this probably
exaggerates the liberal tradition's insignificance, there were other intellectual
traditions that the Framers inherited, and "a thinker of the time could even be
attracted simultaneously to contradictory or even mutually exclusive concepts."83
One of the most influential of such concepts was civic republicanism-"the idea

76.
77.
78.
79.

See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510.
See JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826).
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135) (Thomas' alterations).
Id. at 505 (quoting I BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 134-35) (first alteration added).

80.

SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 19.

81. Id. at 12-16.
82. See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 7-8 (1956); NOVAK,
supra note 22, at 2-3, 6-8 (1996); Scheiber, supra note 21, at 218; cf. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 224 (1990) (discussing the "complex,
paradoxical, and mythical dimensions of property's importance in American constitutionalism").
83. SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 12 (citation omitted).
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that private 'interests' could and should be subordinated to the common welfare
of the polity." According to republican ideology, which stemmed from James
Harrington's 1656 treatise Oceana,5s the objective of government was to protect
"the political liberty of the collective people," and republicans were less
concerned with protecting individual liberty against collective encroachment than
with protecting "the public rights of the people against aristocratic privileges and
power. 8 6 Unlike Blackstone, Harrington advocated protecting individual liberty
by redistributing property to ensure the survival of a republican form of
government." A citizen who owned private property was freed from the burden
of providing for his own personal welfare and could instead pursue the civic
virtue of pursuing the common welfare." Although the influence of republican
thought began to wane after the turn of the nineteenth century, 9 even James
Kent's brief discussion of eminent domain in his Commentaries on American
Law, published in 1826, still reflected civic republican ideas. 90 Kent lists eminent
domain as an example of the "many cases in which the rights of property must be
made subservient to the public welfare." 9' Kent's definition of eminent domain
emphasized that the power "gives to the legislature the control of private property
for public uses, and for public uses only. 'g But it is far from clear that Kent
would have agreed with Justice Thomas' narrow construction of the phrase "for
public uses," given that Kent often substitutes phrases such as "general interest[s]
of the community" and "purpose[s] ...of a public nature:"
It undoubtedly must rest in the wisdom of the legislature to determine
when public uses require the assumption of private property, and if they
should take it for a purpose not of a public nature, as if the legislature
should take the property of A. and give it to B., the law would be unconstitutional and void. 93

84. ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 29.
85. SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 16-17 (discussing JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF
OCEANA (1656)).
86. ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 29.
87. SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 17.
88. ALEXANDER, supranote 23, at 29.
89. Cf. HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 64 (noting that as late as 1800, "there still existed a perhaps
dominant body of opinion maintaining that individuals held their property at the sufferance of the state").
90. See 2 KENT, supra note 77, at 274-76.
91. Id. at 274-75.
92. Id. at 275.
93. Id. at 276 (emphasis added). Kent also states that "[pirivate interest must be made subservient to the
general interest of the community." Id. Although Kent's views on the role of private property were influenced
by Federalists such as Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, his "formative years were spent in the revolutionary
and constitutional periods when the political language of civic republicanism provided common vocabulary that
crossed party lines." ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 134-35.
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Many of the Founders did not consider the public good to be in direct
conflict with private interests but rather understood them to mutually reinforce
one another. ' Blackstone himself understood this interrelationship between the
public good and private interests, noting that "the public good is in nothing more
essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual's private rights." 95
Furthermore, Blackstone may not have held the views that are now commonly
attributed to him,96 and the excerpts from his Commentaries quoted by Thomas
are taken out of context. Thomas quotes Blackstone to argue that the law's
"great... regard... for private property" would not permit "the least violation
of it,.
even for the general good of the whole community .... without the
owner's consent. 97 For Blackstone, however, the "great ...regard of the law for
private property" meant that it would "not authorize the least violation of it" by
the Crown.9' But the legislature's authority to take private property was clear"the legislature alone, can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the
individual to acquiesce" to the public good. 99 The way the legislature could
"compel the individual" was "by giving him full indemnification" such that
"[tihe public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for
an exchange."' However, the analogy to private transactions does not suggest an
"actual use" limitation as Thomas implies, but rather signifies Blackstone's belief
that an owner who is compelled to relinquish private property to the public must
receive "full indemnification," just as if he voluntarily transferred his property to
another individual.'' "All that the legislature does," Blackstone writes, "is to

ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 26-30.
95. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135.
96. See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 22, at 32 (noting that nineteenth-century jurists' conception of
Blackstone was that "the individual and his interests preceded and trumped society and social interests").
97. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135).
98. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135 (describing eminent domain as "an exertion of power, ....
which nothing but the legislature can perform"). John Locke, like Blackstone, was more concerned about
arbitrary confiscations of private property by kings than by legislatures and suggested that government by the
people's representatives would guard against such abuses. Locke explained that such arbitrary takings of
property are
not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists.., in assemblies which are
variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects under the common laws
of their country, equally with the rest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting
assembly always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they
will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to
increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people.
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 140 (1690). Locke also noted that government can only take
property "with his [the owner's] own consent-i.e., the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves
or their representatives chosen by them." Id.
99. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135.
100. Id.
101. Compare id. ("But how does [the legislature] interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the
subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the
injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an

94.
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oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price."'' 2 Legislative
eminent domain authority did not contradict Blackstone's "absolute" private
property rights because Blackstone, like the American republicans, believed that
property rights were at least partly a creation of society.' °3 "The origin of private
property is probably founded in nature, ... but certainly the modifications under
which we at present find it ... are entirely derived from society; and are some of
those civil advantages, in exchange for which every individual has resigned a
part of his natural liberty."'' 4 For Blackstone, and probably for the Framers as
well, "absolute" private property rights had an altogether different meaning than
is commonly supposed.' 5 Moreover, if Blackstone can be read to suggest a public
use limitation at all, he is more in tune with the Kelo majority than with Thomas'
dissent. Blackstone's discussion of the legislature's power to take private
property does not even mention "public use," but instead refers to takings that are
"extensively beneficial to the public" or for the "common good" or "the public
good."' 06
Regardless of whether Blackstone actually viewed private property rights as
so sacred that they could not be violated "even for the general good of the whole
community, '' °' Thomas provides no indication of the extent that such ideas
played a role in the drafting of the Takings Clause, and he completely ignores
members of the founding generation that emphatically disagreed with any
absolute conception of property rights.'0 8 For example, James Wilson, who was a
exchange."), with Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510 ("Only 'by giving [the landowner] full indemnification' could the
government take property, and even then '[t]he public [was] now considered as an individual, treating with an
individual for an exchange."' (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135) (Thomas' alterations)).
102. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135.
103. ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 27; SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 19. Moreover, a landowner's
consent to a taking could reasonably stem from a decision made by the landowner's elected representatives. See
LOCKE, supra note 98, at § 140 (noting that government can only take property "with his [the owner's] own
consent-i.e., the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by
them").
104. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 134.
105. See SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 19 (noting that although Blackstone describes property rights as
absolute, "this [right] ... is tempered by 'the laws of the land' and subject to legal restrictions (which are
numerous)").
106. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135.
107. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135). But see NOVAK, supra note 22, at 264 n.62 ("Blackstone often
substantially qualified his bold generalizations on rights by the time he finished his more substantive, doctrinal
discussions."); Harrington, supra note 44, at 1267-68 & nn.80-81 (noting that both Blackstone and Locke
recognized that some takings occurred without compensation).
108. Thomas is probably correct that Blackstone's ideas influenced early state eminent domain
practices, but that influence was largely manifested by the gradual adoption by the states of a compensation
requirement. See HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 63-65. As late as 1820, a majority of the original colonies had not
yet added compensation requirements to their state constitutions. Id. at 64. But as the nineteenth century
progressed, the influence of "Blackstone's strict views about the necessity of providing compensation" led
states to gradually adopt constitutional and statutory provisions requiring compensation for takings of property.
Id. at 63-65. For example, James Kent quoted extensively from Blackstone in his opinion in Gardner v. Village
of Newburgh to emphasize the importance of compensation as a means of protecting individuals against
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delegate at the Constitutional Convention '°9 and a Supreme Court Justice from
1789 until his death in 1798, believed that property rights were both social and
relative, rather than individual and absolute, and criticized the Lockean "selfish
philosophy" of absolute individual rights.' 0 According to Wilson, individual
rights would be better secured by preserving the common welfare of the entire
polity to ensure the survival of a republican government.''
Wilson and other early American judges and legal thinkers" 2 actively
developed a theory of public rights in accordance with the common-law principle
of salus populi suprema lex est-"the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.""' 3 The principle of salus populi formed the basis of what William Novak
calls the "well-regulated society," in which "the rights of individuals were not
protected absolutely, according to... unchanging, natural laws of economic or
individual behavior." 4 Similarly, Harry Scheiber has demonstrated that in
antebellum America,
judges gave a good deal of sustained attention to producing a theory of
"public rights" (trenching seriously on private claims to property), and
the law was responsive to the imperatives of that theory in balancing off
claims of the public good against5 constitutional mandates for the
protection of private "vested" rights."

Thomas' Kelo dissent does not mention Justice Wilson. Instead, to support
his assertion that the Public Use Clause is an embodiment of absolute private
property rights, Thomas cites Justice Chase's well-known dictum in Calder v.
Bull' 6 that "a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B." is obviously
invalid." 7 But the prevalence of republican ideas among the founding
arbitrary takings of private property. See Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
109. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS 45, 49 (2002).
110. NOVAK, supra note 22, at 30-31, 36. In contrast with "modem attempts to construct a general
politics of philosophy from particular, enumerated powers or the Bill of Rights," Wilson analyzed the
Constitution by beginning with its broad goals and only then proceeding to specific rules. Id. at 268 n. 118.
111. Id. at 34.
112. Another early jurist who combined Blackstone's ideas about the necessity of compensation with
republican ideals about the supremacy of the common welfare was Justice William Patterson. In a 1795 circuit
court opinion, Justice Patterson agreed with Blackstone that "[t]he preservation of property ... is a primary
object of the social compact." Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). He
unequivocally qualified that statement, however, with the admonition that "[e]very person ought to contribute
his proportion for public purposes and public exigencies" but "no one can be called upon to surrender or
sacrifice his whole property, real and personal, for the good of the community, without receiving a recompense
in value." Id. Justice Patterson's opinion in Vanhorne's Lessee is discussed more fully in Part V, infra.
113. NOVAK, supra note 22, at 9, 30-35, 41-42.
114. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
115. Scheiber, supra note 21, at 219.
116. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
117. Id. at 388, cited in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
This dicta has been cited as a rhetorical flourish by all sides in the public use debate. Breau, supra note 66, at
850 n.91. Less often noted is that Justice Chase went on to state that the legislature could authorize a taking of
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generation"' undermines Thomas' assumption that the original meaning of the
Takings Clause is solely represented by the so-called Blackstonian views of
Justice Chase" 9 rather than by the Harringtonian views of Justice Wilson."20
IV. EARLY STATE PRACTICES
An examination of the eminent domain practices of the states during the first
half-century after the founding provides insight into how the eminent domain2
authority of the states was limited by the Takings Clauses in state constitutions.'
Because many state takings clauses contain language similar to the Federal
Takings Clause, they are indicative of how the founding generation viewed the
Federal Takings Clause as a limit on governmental authority. Thomas' survey
of early state practices leads him to conclude that those practices conformed with
his narrow conception of public use. 23 But the historical record is less conclusive
than Thomas' dissent suggests.
A.

The Mill Acts

One well-known early exercise of eminent domain by the states was the
passage of Mill Acts. 24 Mills operated by harnessing the power generated by
falling water, and dams were required to raise the water level. Such dams often
permanently flooded neighbors' upstream lands.'25 Mill Acts allowed mill-owners
to construct dams and prevented the owners of flooded land from obtaining
injunctive or monetary relief for trespass or nuisance through the courts.'26
During the eighteenth century, most mills were either grist mills or saw mills, but
advances in technology during the nineteenth century enabled the construction of
cotton mills, 27 ironworks,' and other manufacturing operations that required
private property only "for the benefit of the whole community, and on making full satisfaction." Calder,3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) at 392 (emphasis added); see also infra note 216.
118. ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 26-36; see supra note 112; see also supra notes 84-93 and
accompanying text.
119. As noted above, it is questionable whether Blackstone would actually agree with today's
Blackstonians. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 25 (noting that although eminent domain was a wellrecognized governmental power by 1787, "just compensation was not a widely accepted practice, despite the
fact that Blackstone. .. [had] endorsed this concept").
121. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511-12. See generally NOVAK, supra note 22 (providing examples of state
regulation, confiscation, and destruction of private property in antebellum America to demonstrate the extent
that the public welfare took precedence over private property rights).
122. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512; HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 48; SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 26.
123. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511-14.
124. SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 26.
125. Id.
126. HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 48.
127. Id. at 50.
128. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 248.
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mechanical power generated by falling water. The Mill Acts often, though not
always, provided for statutory procedures to enable upstream owners to obtain
compensation, but mill owners could sometimes avoid liability by showing that
the flooding resulted in a net benefit to the owner of flooded land. 29
Thomas argues in his Kelo dissent that the taking of private property enabled
by these early Mill Acts was for actual use by the public because the earliest
mills were "compelled to serve the public for a stipulated toll."'"3 Thomas also
notes the objects of other early exercises of eminent domain that in his view
support the "actual use" standard, such as "public roads, toll roads, ferries,
canals, railroads, and public parks."'' Putting aside historical inaccuracies for a
moment,'32 Thomas' characterization of the Mill Acts could actually support the
constitutionality of the takings challenged in Kelo, even under his "actual use"
standard. Regardless of whether early mills were actually used by the public,'
the flooded lands were certainly not. The taking of land by flooding certainly
benefited the public by enabling the construction of mills that the public could
use, but contrary to Thomas' implication, the public did not actually use the
flooded land. Rather, the public used the mills, and the mills in turn could operate
only because upstream land had been flooded.
This distinction is admittedly too clever by half, but the point is that if the
land taken under the Mill Acts is considered to have been actually used by the
public, as Thomas suggests, then the taking in Kelo easily qualifies as a public
use as well. Thomas' reasoning suggests that when a merchant is authorized by
the government to take private property to construct a facility that provides a
service for a fee to the public, the public actually uses the taken property. 34 The
property at issue in Kelo was to be used "to support the adjacent state park, by
providing parking or retail services to visitors, or to support the nearby marina"
and to build "at least 90,000 square feet of research and development office
space."'33 These uses easily satisfy Thomas' test. Members of the public will
actually use the parking facilities that are provided for visitors to the state park.
Retail stores are also public uses by any definition-Lewis' 1888 treatise that

129.

HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 48; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 255-60; SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 26-

27.
130. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 512 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting LEWIS,
supra note 26, at 246).
131. Id.
132. The public often had no legal right to use the property taken under these early Mill Acts. See infra
notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
133. Thomas is not clear whether he would require actual use by the public or merely that the public
have a legal right to use the taken property. See supra note 20.
134. The mills charged a fee to anyone who wished to use their facilities. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 246
n.3.
135. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474 (majority opinion). The entire redevelopment plan used ninety acres of land
divided into seven parcels and the plaintiffs' properties were situated on just two of these parcels. The plan
specified that these parcels would be used for park or marina support or for office space. Id. Owners of property
on the other parcels had voluntarily sold their land to the city. Id. at 475.
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Thomas relies on for much of the historical data in his dissent states that
"[p]roperty taken for public buildings of all kinds, such as... markets.., and
the like, is taken for public use."'36 Thomas, however, omits "markets" from his
list of public uses cited from this treatise.37
Another particularly relevant omission from the list of public uses catalogued
by Lewis in 1888 is what Lewis calls "improving navigation,"'' which includes
taking land "on the banks of navigable streams for public landing places ' or, in
modem parlance, a marina. If the Kelo plaintiffs' property is to provide parking
or warehouse space for the nearby marina, that is a public use according to
Thomas' definition, and even if members of the public do not directly use the
taken property when they use the marina, Thomas' public use test is satisfied as
per his characterization of the Mill Acts.'4 0 To be sure, early mills could not
operate without being able to flood upstream lands, whereas marina or park
"support" may not be strictly necessary for those facilities to operate. But
Thomas' own textual analysis mitigates against a strict necessity requirement.
That textual analysis includes a comparison of the Federal Public Use Clause to
equivalent restrictions in three other pre-1791 founding documents. 14 ' As is
explained above, those three Takings Clauses require that a taking of property be
because of some "public exigency" or "public necessity" in addition to requiring
that the taken property be for a public use. 142 Accordingly, Thomas should
consider it significant that the Federal Takings Clause lacks an equivalent
requirement and, to be consistent, should hold that using the property taken from
the Kelo plaintiffs for park or marina support satisfies the federal public use
requirement even if that property is not strictly necessary for the operation of
those facilities.
The proposed development at issue in Kelo called for 90,000 square feet of
office space. Office space is also actually used by the public. Any member of the
public that is willing and able to lease the space may presumably do so, just as
any member of the public who was able to pay the price to use a mill could do
so. 14 Admittedly, the "public" character of property taken for office space seems
136. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 242 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also NOVAK, supra note
22, at 95-105 (explaining the extent of governmental control over urban markets-i.e., "that place near the
center of town where farmers, butchers, and householders exchanged necessary provisions"-during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
137. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing LEWIS, supra note 26, at 227-28, 234-41,
243); see also supra text accompanying note 131.
138. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 244-45.
139. Id.
140. See supranotes 133-34 and accompanying text.
141. These documents are the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, the Vermont Constitution of
1786, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509-10.
142. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text. The Northwest Ordinance does not actually contain
a public use limitation at all. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
143. See LEWIS, supra note 26, at 246 n.3 (explaining that the mills charged a fee to anyone who wished
to use their facilities).
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qualitatively different than that of property taken under the Mill Acts, if only
because of the significant difference in the length of time of each individual's
use-the term of an office lease is usually measured in years, whereas the use of
a mill was probably measured in hours or days. But such a normative distinction
presumably would be irrelevant when considering the "original meaning" of the
Public Use Clause. Rather, the taking is constitutional as long as the public has "a
legal right to use the property,"'" which would seem to be the case here.
Finally, regardless of whether the takings in Kelo satisfy an "actual use"
standard, Thomas' assertion that the early Mill Acts "compelled" mills to serve
the public is historically inaccurate. 41 In the eighteenth century, most mills were
for grinding grain and were "understood to be open to the public,"'' 46 though
whether they were "compelled" to serve the public is less certain. Thomas cites
Lewis' treatise to support this proposition,' 47 and the section of the treatise that
48
Thomas cites provides a short description of early Mill Acts in fifteen states.
Although all fifteen states regulated the prices charged by millers to some extent,
Lewis mentions that just five of those states-Alabama, Delaware, Georgia,
Kentucky, and North Carolina-actually required millers to grind for the public,
and Alabama and Connecticut appear to have adopted these requirements after
1791.'" Moreover, as is discussed below, in one of the earliest major cases
upholding the constitutionality of a Mill Act, the public had no legal right to use
the millworks at issue."O
B. Early State Law Takings Cases
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, the Mill Acts were extended to "saw,
paper, and cotton mills, many of which served only the proprietor,"' 5 and as early as
1814, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found such a broad Mill Act
constitutional. 52 Thomas, however, dismisses such "later extension[s]" as "not
deeply probative" of whether early state practice was consistent with the original
meaning of the Public Use Clause,'53 even though virtually no cases on the meaning
of "public use" were decided before 1814. In fact, seven of the nine cases Thomas

144. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521. However, whether Thomas requires "legal" use or "actual" use is not clear
from his opinion. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
145. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512 (noting that the earliest mills were "compelled to serve the public for a
stipulated toll" (quoting LEWIS, supranote 26, at 246)).
146. HORW[TZ, supra note 25, at 49.
147. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512 (citing LEWIS, supra note 26, at 246 & n.3).
148. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 246 & n.3.
149. Id. at 246 n.3.
150. See Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467, 476-77 (1832), discussed
infra in note 162-65 and accompanying text.
151.

HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 49.

152.
153.

Stowell v. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364, 368 (1814), discussed in HORWrrz, supra note 25, at 49.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 514 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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cites as examples of courts that "adhered to the natural meaning of 'public use' were
decided after 1870,114 by which time the republican ideas that were prevalent at the
time of the founding were already being supplanted with "new political voices and
new legal languages"' 5 that emphasized the dichotomy and conflict- between the
public good and private interest.'
Of the remaining two cases Thomas cites, one is an 1859 Alabama decision that
was limited to holding that "purely private" roads and mills were not public uses,'5 7
but the case does not go so far as to hold that "public use" always requires actual use
by the public.'5 8 The second case-the earliest that Thomas cites as exemplary of
early state practice-is Harding v. Goodlett, 5 9 an 1832 Tennessee case that, like the
1859 Alabama decision, turns more on the interpretation of the particular statute at
issue than on the proper interpretation of Tennessee's Public Use Clause. 6 Notably,
Thomas makes no mention of two other 1832 cases that both directly addressed the
meaning of public use.' 6 1 In Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 162 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the construction of dams necessary
for the operation of "grist-mills, iron manufactories, and other mills for other useful
purposes" satisfied the Massachusetts Public Use Clause. 6 Even though the public
had no legal right to use the manufacturing operations, the court was "at a loss to
imagine any [private] undertaking... in which the public had a more certain and
direct interest and benefit."' 6
Take the grist-mill established in this city, as an example. Is it of no benefit
to have the corn ground near to the inhabitants, rather than at a distance?

154. Id. at 513-14 n.2. These seven cases were decided in 1871, 1877, 1883, 1903, 1906, 1907, and
1908. Id.
155. NoVAK, supra note 22, at 240.
156. Id. at 239-48.
157. Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 332-34 (1859), cited in Kelo, 545 U.S. at 513-14 n.2.
158. See LEWIS, supra note 26, at 229 & n.2 (characterizing Sadler as holding that "when [a] road, after
being laid out, becomes the property of the applicant, from which he may lawfully exclude the public, then the
use is strictly private and the law authorizing the condemnation of property therefor is void"). Lewis also
characterized Sadler as holding that "in a state where the only kind of mills regarded as a public use are public
grist-mills, a statute which authorized the condemnation of property for the erection of a 'mill or other
machinery' was.., void." Id. at 284 & n.2.
159. 11 Tenn. (3 Yerg.) 41(1832), cited in Kelo, 545 U.S. at 513-14 n.2.
160. Harding, I I Tenn. (3 Yerg.) at 52-54; see also LEWIS, supra note 26, at 250 & n.3 (noting that the
decision in Harding was that "under an act which related solely to grist-mills, an application for a grist-mill,
saw-mill and paper-mill could not be granted"). Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the Harding court
described the public use requirement in broad terms: "It is only for public uses the state is authorized to exercise
[its eminent domain power].., because the interests of the community require thatfor the good of the whole,
the private right must be yielded." Harding, 11 Tenn. (3 Yerg.) at 52 (emphasis added).
161. The 1888 treatise that Thomas relies on for much of his historical information discusses the
Tennessee case almost as an afterthought following the discussion of these two other 1832 cases. See LEWIS,
supranote 26, at 247-50.
162. 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467 (1832).
163. Id. at 476.
164. Id., quoted in LEWIS, supra note 26, at 248.
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"But you cannot compel the miller to grind your corn for the toll, as you
may the proprietors of the turnpike to let you travel over the road for a toll."
If there be not an actual, there is a moral necessity imposed upon the owner
of the mill, to accommodate
the public to the extent of his power. Who ever
65
heard of a refusal?
The other important 1832 public use case that goes unmentioned in Thomas'
dissent is Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co. 166 In Scudder, the New Jersey
Court of Chancery upheld the application of a Mill Act to private manufacturing
mills because it considered the public use limitation to be satisfied by the
economic
benefit that would result from the mills' "stimulus to industry of every
67
kind."1

It is unsurprising that Thomas does not discuss Boston & Roxbury Mill or
Scudder-these courts' understanding of public use almost directly contradicts
Thomas' assertion in Kelo that a "promise of new jobs and increased tax
revenue" was not consistent Public Use Clause's original meaning. 6 6 The Boston
& Roxbury Mill court emphatically approved job creation as a valid public use:
[I]n regard to the manufacturing establishments, is it nothing to the
public that great numbers of citizens have the means of employment
brought to their homes? And are not the proprietors obliged to give
employment? They cannot carry their works on without labor, and who
that is disposed to industry and to that kind of employment, is prevented
from its exercise? ... [T]he interest or benefit arising from manufacturing establishments is distributed quite as much, and oftentimes
more, among
the laborers and operatives, than among the proprietors of
169
the works.

Although neither court addressed increasing tax revenue as a valid public
use, the Scudder court came close when it explicitly categorized "increas[ing] the
value of property" as a legitimate public use.'7 ° Thomas simply misconstrues

165. Id. at 477, quoted in LEWIS, supra note 26, at 248.
166. 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (N.J. Ch. 1832). Scudder has been described as "the first significant public use
challenge" to a state act authorizing the flooding of private property for industrial mills. Meidinger, supra note
44, at 23-24. Incidentally, the plaintiffs in Scudder sought relief in equity because New Jersey had no just
compensation requirement until 1844. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 35-36.
167. Scudder, I N.J. Eq. at 729.
168. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
169. Boston & Roxbury Mill Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) at 477. In Kelo, the firms that will occupy the
90,000 square feet of research and development office space presumably "cannot carry their works on without
labor," see id., which suggests that office space is a use that is consistent with the public use requirement under
Boston & Roxbury Mill. Thomas provides no citation to an earlier case, and thus Boston & Roxbury Mill is
arguably a better indicator of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause than any of the cases he cites to
support his understanding of the states' early eminent domain practices.
170. Scudder, 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (N.J. Ch. 1832).
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history when he asserts that early state practice generally conformed to the actual
use standard. In fact, the opposite appears to be true-one scholar has noted that
"the first ...

articulation of the narrow construction of public use" by a state

court was not until 1837.' 7' Before that, the few courts that discussed public use
interpreted that clause broadly, and many of these courts were
more than willing
7
1
development.
economic
of
purpose
the
for
takings
to allow
V. SEPARATING THE WHEAT FROM THE CHAFF

Originalism is a time-consuming endeavor. Sifting through primary and
secondary sources to accurately ascertain a constitutional provision's original
meaning takes many hours of research, and it may be unrealistic to expect the
Justices and their clerks to do this on the Court's schedule. To write this article, the

author conducted about two months of research. Although the Court's caseload has
diminished in recent years,'73 the Justices and their clerks simply may not have the

time to devote several months to researching the history of a single constitutional
provision. During the term that Kelo was decided, the Court decided eighty cases,
and Justice Thomas personally authored thirty-four opinions, more than any other
Justice that term. 74 The Justices' law clerks are also quite busy-they deal with
thousands of petitions for certiorari each term, draft bench memos on a daily basis,
review emergency requests to stay state executions, and research and write drafts of
opinions. 75 Such a schedule means that most historical research conducted by the
Justices or their clerks is probably limited to the information provided to the Court in
briefs submitted by the litigants and amici.
171. SCHULTZ, supra note 14, at 76 (discussing Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9
(N.Y. 1837)).
172. Id. at 75-76. For example, in the earliest federal public use decision that this author was able to
locate, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia considered a public use challenge to a statute that
delegated eminent domain authority to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad-a private corporation-to allow it to
extend its lines into the District of Columbia. Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. 574 (C.C.D.D.C.
1835). The court rejected the challenge because
this railroad, although it may be profitable to the stockholders, is also a great public benefit. It does
not prevent the public from enjoying all the advantages which they enjoyed before, and gives them a
cheaper, safer, and more expeditious mode of traveling than they would otherwise have. If it may not
be called a common highway, yet it is really a common good. It is a great public convenience....
The condemnation of land, for such purposes, has been so general, and so extensive, for many years,
that it may well be considered as established by the law of the land .... The condemnation of the
land, therefore, is clearly for the... public use ....
Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
173. See Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard
Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (2004) (discussing the gradual decline in the Supreme Court's caseload from
1926 to 2004). One reason the Court's diminishing caseload may not result in more time for the Justices and
their clerks is the dramatic increase in the number of amicus briefs filed in Supreme Court cases during the last
several decades. Joseph D. Keamey & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 751-56 (2000).
174. The Supreme Court,2004 Term-The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415,420 tbl.I (2005).
175. Kevin J. Worthen, Shirt-Tales: Clerking for Byron White, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 349, 354 (1994).

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
Briefs submitted by amici are likely to be the primary way that historical
information is presented to the Court because page limits and the need to cover
many relevant issues prevent the litigants themselves from devoting much space
to arguments about a clause's original meaning.7 6 But amicus briefs, no less than
the litigants' briefs, are meant to persuade rather than to inform,' and therefore
they may lack the objectivity that might be found in a dispassionate historical
treatise. When briefs present arguments based on non-legal fields of expertise,
the Justices and their clerks may have difficulty judging the validity of those
arguments simply because they likely do not have the necessary expertise in the
underlying field." 8 This concern has been raised regarding the Court's use of
social science research and data from empirical studies, 7 9 and scholars have
expressed concern about "advocacy disguised as social science in amicus curiae
briefs" and about the Court's difficulty in evaluating the arguments presented in
such briefs." 0
The same problem exists when the Justices rely on the necessarily advocacyoriented history lessons presented to the Court in amicus briefs. In Kelo, an
amicus brief submitted by the Claremont Institute1' in support of the petitioners
was the only brief that solely addressed the question of "[w]hether the original
meaning of ...the Public Use Clause requires the public actually to use the
property it takes,"''8 2 whereas the discussion of the Clause's original meaning in

176. See Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 606 (1984) ("Because of
page limits, or considerations of tone and emphasis, parties are frequently forced to make some of the points
they wish to make in rather abbreviated form. A supportive amicus can flesh out those points with additional
discussion and citation of authority."); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 173, at 830 ("Amicus briefs matter
insofar as they provide legally relevant information not supplied by the parties to the case-information that
assists the Court in reaching the correct decision as defined by the complex norms of our legal culture.").
177. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective
Distortionin Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91,99-100 (1993).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, The EmpiricalJurisprudenceof the United States Supreme Court, 13
AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 337-45 (1987) (describing problems with the Court's interpretation of empirical studies
that were presented as evidence in two capital murder cases); Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So
Weisman: The Supreme Court's ContinuingMisuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE
279, 288-93 (1995) (criticizing Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992), because "Justice Kennedy cited only three isolated, marginally analogous studies from which he drew
conclusions that were unwarranted and went far beyond those to which the authors of the studies themselves
came"); Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science
Research in the Supreme Court, 42 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 57, 70 (noting that the social
science data the Court relied on in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), "was methodologically
unsound"); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 177, at 128 (analyzing the empirical studies cited by amicus briefs
submitted in three major Supreme Court punitive damages cases and finding "a systematic misuse of empirical
research" by these amicus briefs, "a phenomenon [the authors] call[ed] 'junk social science').
180. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 177, at 99-100, 119-22.
181. The Claremont Institute's self-described mission is "to restore the principles of the American
Founding to their rightful, preeminent authority in our national life." The Claremont Institute, http://www.
claremont.org (last visited May 8, 2007).
182. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute et al. in Support of Petitioners at i, Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108) [hereinafter "Claremont Brief']. The Claremont Brief
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the litigants' briefs was far more limited.' 3 This amicus brief was certainly aimed
at persuading the Court to adopt a particular position,M and as is discussed
below, Thomas appears to have taken many of the arguments in his dissent
directly from the Claremont Institute's brief without applying enough scrutiny to
its misleading version of history.85 The Justices and their clerks are trained as
lawyers. Properly evaluating historically-based arguments such as those in the
Claremont Brief requires them to become expert historians, something they may
simply not have the time to do between the first Monday in October and the last
Monday in June.
Comparing the Claremont Brief to Thomas' Kelo dissent illustrates the
importance of subjecting the arguments in such a brief to careful scrutiny and
critical analysis. The Claremont Brief, like Thomas' dissent, :begins by discussing
the definition of "use" in Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English
Language."' As was discussed above, Johnson's definition is far less conclusive
than either the Claremont Institute's Brief or Thomas' dissent would indicate.'87
The Claremont Institute argues that Johnson's other definitions for "use," such as
"convenience" and "help," were "merely... secondary meaning[s], not the most
common meaning of the word."'88 The Claremont Institute provides no authority
for this proposition, and Johnson's Dictionary does not indicate how common or
uncommon any of the nine definitions of the word "use" actually were during the
late eighteenth century."' Thomas' focus on this argument implies that he may
simply have accepted the accuracy of this textual analysis without conducting
any meaningful independent research on the issue.
Thomas also does not seem to have scrutinized the Claremont Institute's
selective quotations of Blackstone's Commentaries. Both Thomas and the
Claremont Institute completely omit Blackstone's distinction between the
legislature's authority to take private property in exchange for compensation and
the arbitrary confiscations by the Crown that Blackstone and others sought to

essentially summarizes the arguments made in a 2004 article written by one of the authors. See generally Eric
R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and NaturalPropertyRights, 2004 MICH.ST. L. REV. 877 (2004).
183. Brief of the Respondents at 28-32, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108); Reply Brief of Petitioner's at
2-3, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108).
184. See Claremont Brief, supra note 182, at 5 ("The Court should strive to do what Justice Thomas did
for Commerce Clause doctrine in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez: Construe its public use
'jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of [its] more recent case law and is more faithful to the
original meaning of that Clause."' (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995))).
185. See infra notes 188-227 and accompanying text.
186. See Claremont Brief, supra note 182, at 6 (citing 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (8th ed. 1786)). Justice Thomas cited Johnson's fourth edition, which was published in
1773. See supra note 29.
187. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
188. Claremont Brief, supra note 182, at 6.
189. To be sure, the definition that Thomas and the Claremont Brief's authors prefer is the first
definition listed, but there is no indication that the second, fourth, or fifth definitions were not as common or
nearly so. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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eradicate.' 9° Rather, both emphasize that Blackstone describes the eminent
domain transaction as one in which "the public is now considered as an
individual, treating with an individual for an exchange,"' 9' apparently to imply
that the public must use the taken property in the same way that an individual
purchaser would. But both omit Blackstone's very next sentence, in which he
explains that this transaction is quite different from a land sale between private
parties: "All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his
possessions for a reasonable price.' 92 A close reading of Blackstone, then, casts
doubt on the Claremont Institute's contention that "Blackstone's understanding
of eminent domain left no room for the broad reading of 'public usefulness."" 93
Thomas' complete adoption of the Claremont Institute's arguments to that effect
suggest that he did not independently analyze the actual text of Blackstone's
Commentaries.
These examples demonstrate that historical research depends on first-hand
examination of primary sources, an endeavor in which the Justices and their
clerks, often recent law-school graduates,' 94 have had little training or experience.
The Claremont Institute does, however, devote several pages of its brief to
discussing a primary source of a type quite familiar to the Justices and their law
clerks-a court opinion. Specifically, the Claremont Institute points to Supreme
Court Justice William Patterson's 1795 circuit court opinion in Vanhorne's
Lessee v. Dorrance95 and notes that "the Institute is not aware of any primary
source that explains how 1790s-era Americans understood public use limitations
better than [that] opinion." 196 The Claremont Brief compares Patterson's
statement that "[i]t is ...difficult to form a case, in which the necessity can be of

such a nature, as to authorise or excuse the seizing of landed property belonging
to one citizen, and giving it to another citizen"' 97 with the Connecticut law at
issue in Kelo that, according to the Claremont Brief, "presumes that city officials
190. See supra notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
191. See Claremont Brief, supra note 182, at 12 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135
(emphasis in Claremont Brief)); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the same passage).
192. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 135 (emphasis added). Neither Thomas nor the Claremont
Institute would likely be comforted by Blackstone's reassurance that "oblig[ing] the owner to alienate his
possessions" is "[a]ll that the legislature does." Id.
193. Claremont Brief, supra note 182, at 12; see also supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
194. Three of Thomas' four clerks for the October 2004 term graduated law school in 2003 (the fourth
graduated in 2002), and all of their post-law school work experience consisted only of clerking for federal
judges. List of Law Clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List
of law clerks_of.the.SupremeCourtof theUnitedStates (last visited May 8, 2007).
195. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); Claremont Brief, supra note 182, at 14-16. Vanhorne's
Lessee is one of several that Thomas cites to support the proposition that "the Public Use Clause... embodied
the Framers' understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right, prohibiting the government from
'tak[ing] property from A. and giv[ing] it to B."' Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (2 DalI.)
386, 388 (1798); citing Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 311).
196. Claremont Brief, supra note 182, at 14.
197. Id. at 15 (quoting Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 311).
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may and should redistribute land in whatever way is most advantageous for their
cities." 9 This "stark contrast" leads the Claremont Brief to conclude with
Patterson's words that "[i]t is infinitely wiser and safer to risk some possible
mischiefs, than to vest in the legislature so unnecessary, dangerous, and
enormous a power."' 99 The clear implication is that taking property from one
citizen and giving it to another was the "dangerous... power" that Patterson did
not want to vest in the legislature, and that a taking such as the one at issue in
Kelo would not have been considered a public use in 1795.
Although Thomas does not discuss Vanhorne's Lessee, he cites it as
supporting the proposition that "the Public Use Clause... prohibit[s] the government from 'tak[ing] property from A. and giv[ing] it to B."' 2°° It seems likely,
however, that Thomas' citation to the case was based on the Claremont
Institute's analysis rather than on his or his clerks' own review of Patterson's
opinion because, had they done so, they undoubtedly would have realized that the
case in fact supports the nearly opposite proposition-that the legislature
unquestionably has full authority to take property from one person and give it to
another, as long as certain procedures are followed. °' The "unnecessary,
dangerous, and enormous... power" that to which Patterson referred was not the
power to take property from one citizen and vest it in another. Rather, in the next
sentence after the one quoted in the Claremont Brief, Patterson explains the
power that concerns him: "the Legislature judged of the necessity of the case,
and also of the nature and value of the equivalent. 2 °2
For Patterson, the potential for abuse lay in the legislature's combined power
to decide both that an appropriation of private property was necessary and to
determine the amount of compensation that the landowner would receive: "Such
a case of necessity, andjudging too of the compensation, can never occur in any
nation. 2 °3 Although Patterson could have limited this "dangerous ...power" by
placing a substantive limit on the legislature's authority to determine the
necessity of the taking, he did not. Instead, Patterson eliminated the legislature's
authority to determine the amount and form of compensation. 204

198. Id. at 16.
199. Id. (quoting Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) at 312).
200. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510 (Thomas' alterations). The internal quotation is actually taken from Calder, 3
U.S. (3 DalI.) at 388, although as is noted above, Caldersays little about the scope of public use. See supra note
117.
201. Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 312. Patterson explains that "untoward must be the state of
things, that would induce the legislature, supposing they had the power, to divest one individual of his landed
estate merely for the purpose of vesting it in another, even upon full indemnification, unless that
indemnification be ascertainedin the manner which I shall mention hereafter." Id. (emphasis added). Patterson
then goes on to explain the procedure that would make such a taking permissible. See infra note 213 and
accompanying text.
202. Vanhorne's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 312.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 312-13.
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Patterson writes in the typically convoluted style of eighteenth century jurists,
but his analysis proceeds in logical steps. Patterson first observes that "the
preservation of property ...is a primary object of the social compact" and draws
the conclusion that "[t]he legislature, therefore, has no authority to ...divest[] one
citizen of his freehold, and vest[] it in another without a just compensation. 20 5
Next, Patterson goes a step further and inquires whether the legislature can "make
an act, divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting it in another, even with
compensation. ' 2 6 Patterson's answer to this question illuminates his understanding
of the social compact, the common welfare, and the importance that the republican
form of government has for safeguarding that welfare:
That the Legislature, on certain emergencies, had authority to exercise this
high power, has been urged from the nature of the social compact ....The
despotic power, as it is aptly called by some writers, of taking private
property, when state necessity requires, exists in every government; the
existence of such power is necessary; government could not subsist
without it; and if this be the case, it cannot be lodged any where with so
much safety as with the Legislature. The presumption is, that they will not
20 7
call it into exercise except in urgent cases, or cases of the first necessity.
The context for the key passage quoted by the Claremont Institute mentioned
above 208 is now clearer. Patterson had difficulty imagining that the common good
would ever necessitate transferring property from one citizen to another: "[I]t
is... difficult to form a case in which the necessity of a state can be of such a
nature as to authorize or excuse the seizing of landed property belonging to one
citizen and giving it to another citizen." 2°9 He nevertheless believed that if such a
situation arose, it would be the legislature's "sole and exclusive" authority to
determine whether the taking was necessary.2 0' This, then, led to his concern that
the legislature would be both the judge of that necessity as well as the judge of
the amount of compensation to be paid. 2' Contrary to the Claremont Institute's
implication, however, Patterson's solution was not to narrow the meaning of
public use or to increase judicial oversight of the legislature's determination of
necessity. Rather, Patterson explained that
the legislature can take the real estate of A. and give it to B. on making
compensation, the principle and reasoning upon it go no further than to

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
nation.").

Id.at 310.
Id.
Id. at 310-11 (emphasis added).
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
Vanhome's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 311.
Id. at 312.
See id. ("Such a case of necessity, and judging too of the compensation, can never occur in any
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show that the Legislature are the sole and exclusive judges of the
necessity of the case, in which this despotic power should be called into
action. 212
"But," Patterson declared, "here the legislature must stop ....

[T]hey cannot

constitutionally determine upon the amount of compensation, or value of the
land. 't

Although Patterson's language is difficult to parse, a careful reading of the
opinion by a Supreme Court clerk would undoubtedly have uncovered the fact
that Vanhorne's Lessee does not at all support a narrow understanding of public
use as implied by the Claremont Brief. Thomas' citation of Vanhorne's Lessee to
support his argument may suggest that a careful reading was not done. One other
aspect of Vanhorne's Lessee that might have led Thomas and his clerks to
question the Claremont Institute's textual arguments concerns the constitutional
provision at issue in the case-the Takings Clause in the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1790.214 Although this Takings Clause refers to property "taken or
applied to public use," Justice Patterson never once mentions the words "public
use." Instead, he discusses the legislature's authority to take property "for public
purposes" and "for the good of the community ' '2 and concludes that the
legislature has the sole authority to determine that "the public exigencies, or
necessities of the State," require a particular taking of private property. 216
Patterson's language undermines the argument raised by the Claremont Institute

212. Id. (emphasis added).
213. Id. Patterson explained that the legislature "cannot constitutionally determine... the amount of the
compensation, or value of the land," because "[p]ublic exigencies do not require... that the legislature should,
of themselves, without the participation of the proprietor, or intervention of a jury, assess the value of the thing,
or ascertain the amount of the compensation to be paid for it." Id. at 312-13. Patterson's opinion in Vanhorne's
Lessee goes on to describe three ways that the amount of compensation could be determined: (1) "by the
parties-that is, by stipulation between the legislature and the proprietor of the land;" (2) "by commissioners
mutually elected by the parties;" or (3) "by the intervention of a jury." Id. at 313.
214. See PA. CONST. art. IX, § 10 (1790) ("[N]or shall any man's property be taken or applied to public
use, without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being made.").
215. Vanhore's Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 310.
216. Id. at 312. Vanhorne's Lessee is one of many early federal and state court decisions that describe
"public use" in similar terms. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798) ("for the benefit of the
whole community"); Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. 574, 576 (C.C.D.D.C. 1835) ("public
benefit" and "public convenience"); Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467, 476
(1832) ("public... interest and benefit"); State v. Town of Hampton, 2 N.H. 22, 25 (1819) ("public purposes");
Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (N.J. Ch. 1832) ("public importance and utility" and "public
use or benefit"); Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 16 (N.Y. 1837) ("benefit which is to
result to the public"); id. at 24 (opinion of Edwards, Sen.) ("public purposes"); id. at 47 (opinion of Maison,
Sen.) ("public interest and convenience"); Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch.
1831) ("public interest" or "benefit to the public"); Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch.
1816) ("public purposes"); Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 390, 420 (1818) (opinion of Daniel, J.)
("public purposes"); Buckingham v. Smith, 10 Ohio 288, 297 (1840) ("public use, or... public welfare");
Lindsay v. Comm'rs, 2 Bay 38 (S.C. 1796) (opinion of Waties, J.) ("public utility"); Harding v. Goodlett, 11
Tenn. (3 Yerg.) 41, 52 (1832) ("interests of the community" and "good of the whole"); Crenshaw v. Slate River
Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 264 (1828) ("public purposes").
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and echoed by Thomas in his Kelo dissent that Americans in Justice Patterson's
generation understood the words "public use" as having a distinct and more
narrow meaning than the words "public exigencies" or "public necessity" that
appeared in pre-1791 documents such as the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
of 1780, the Vermont Constitution of 1786, and the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 .217

Although the Claremont Brief was the only submission to the Court in Kelo
that focused solely on the Public Use Clause's original meaning, some of the
other briefs argued that a broad conception of public use was common during the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These briefs pointed to academic
research that would have provided enough information to uncover much of the
historical evidence presented in this article. The Brief of the Respondents cites
articles by John F. Hart2"s and Errol P. Meindinger2t9 to support the argument that
early states often "redirected private property towards some other private use
thought to be more advantageous for the common good., 220 The Respondents
explain that the Framers expressed little concern about defining the scope of
public use because they "may well have assumed that representative government
,,2 Several other
would adequately protect against abuses of eminent domain .
amicus briefs relied extensively on Mathew P. Harrington's work222 to support the
proposition that "American legislatures repeatedly used their power of
expropriation to effect all manner of social and economic engineering, frequently
transferring property from one private entity to another where it was thought that
the transfer would effect some greater economic purpose., 223 These amicus briefs
also discussed the extent that civic republican ideas influenced the Founders and
explained that if the Public Use Clause was meant to be a substantive limitation
on eminent domain, the Fifth Amendment would have been more explicit about

217. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 509-10 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Claremont
Brief, supra note 182, at 13-14; see also supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
218.

See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modem Takings Doctrine, 109

HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996).
219. See Meidinger, supra note 44.
220. Brief of the Respondents, supra note 183, at 30-32 (citing Hart, supra note 218, at 1282-83).
221. Id. at 29 (quoting Meidinger, supra note 44, at 17-18).
222. See Harrington, supra note 44.
223. Brief Amici Curiae of Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD) et al. in
Support of Respondents at 12-14, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108) (quoting Harrington, supra note 44, at
1247); Brief of the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, Kelo, 545
U.S. 469 (No. 04-108) [hereinafter National League of Cities Brief] (citing Harrington, supra note 44, at 12991301, for the proposition that "[tihere is no evidence the Framers were concerned about the purposes for which
eminent domain is employed"); Brief for the Massachusetts Chapter of the National Ass'n of Industrial &
Office Properties as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5-8 & nn.10, 17-18, 22, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469
(No. 04-108) [hereinafter Massachusetts Brief] (quoting extensively from Harrington, supra note 44); see also
Brief of the American Planning Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469
(No. 04-108) [hereinafter APA Brief] ("During the colonial and early national periods, the understanding about
the permissible scope of eminent domain appears to have been.. . that the power could be used for any purpose
consistent with public benefit or advantage." (citing Meidinger, supra note 44, at 25)).
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the matter because "[s]uch a limit would have been a monumental alteration in
the nature of representative government as understood by the members of the
founding generation. 224 One amicus brief even mentions the doubts expressed by
John Lewis-the author of the 1888 treatise that Thomas extensively relies on in
his Kelo dissent-about whether the Public Use Clause was ever intended to be a
substantive limitation at all. 225 Although none of these briefs devote as much
space as does the Claremont Brief to the Public Use Clause's original meaning,
they pointed the Court towards an extensive body of research about the
understanding of public use during the early American period that directly
contradicts the account presented by the Claremont Institute.
Of course, most cases require the Justices to choose between contradictory
and often well-supported arguments, and the problem with Thomas' dissent is not
that he found the Claremont Institute's arguments more persuasive than those
presented by other amici. Rather, Thomas' failure to acknowledge any of the
primary and secondary sources that cast considerable doubt on the traditional
property-rights view of the Public Use Clause 226 suggests that Thomas and his
clerks may not have conducted the sort of in-depth historical research required
for an accurate analysis of the Public Use Clause's original meaning. Originalism
as a judicial decision-making methodology depends on accurate historical
research. Such research takes time, especially for non-experts, a group that
includes the Justices and their clerks. The omissions, mischaracterizations, and
inaccuracies in an opinion authored by the Court's most ardent supporter of
originalism may suggest that originalist methodologies cannot reliably be
implemented under the practical constraints of Supreme Court litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION

Thomas begins his dissent by accusing the Kelo majority of replacing the
Public Use Clause with a "'Diverse and Always Evolving Needs of Society'
Clause., 227 But the original meaning of the Public Use Clause may be closer to
that derisive characterization than one might gather from Thomas' opinion.

224. Massachusetts Brief, supra note 223, at 8 n.22 (quoting Harrington, supra note 44, at 1300-01); see
also APA Brief, supra note 223, at 7 n.18 ("[T]he compensation clause was protective of minority rights, and
thus satisfied federalist fears that a landless majority might gain control of the national legislature and impose
confiscating regulations on property .... " (quoting Harrington, supra note 44, at 1297)).
225. See National League of Cities Brief, supra note 223, at 6 (citing LEWIS, supra note 26, at ii, for the
proposition that "the language of the Takings Clause does not impose any limitation other than the payment of
just compensation"). The citation refers to Lewis' preface in which he notes that "[it is certainly questionable
whether anything more was intended by the provision... than as though it read, 'Private property shall not be
taken under the power of eminent domain without just compensation."' LEWIS, supra note 26, at ii; see also
supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 32, 41-48 and accompanying text.
227. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 479
(majority opinion)).
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In 1832, a New Jersey court considered such "evolving needs of society" to
be a part of the public use analysis:
The ever varying condition of society is constantly presenting new
objects of public importance and utility; and what shall be considered a
public use or benefit, may depend somewhat on the situation and wants
of the community for the time being.228
Thomas suggests that these early cases were anomalies in which "state
legislatures tested the limits of their state-law eminent domain power," and he
criticizes the majority for citing such cases as "evidence of the broad 'public
purpose' interpretation of the Public Use Clause. ' 229 Thomas concedes, however,
that the meaning of "public use" was a "hotly contested question in state courts"
during the nineteenth century, 230 and while the majority relies on a century of
Federal Supreme Court precedent when it chooses to read the Public Use Clause
broadly, 23' Thomas falls back on his textual analysis, praising the early decisions
that "adhered to the natural meaning of 'public use.' ' 232 However, as is
demonstrated above, 233 a textual analysis of the Public Use Clause is just as
inconclusive as the early state decisions about the clause's original meaning, all
of which led John Lewis to observe in his 1888 treatise that "[i]f we look to our
dictionaries, we find the same confusion as in the decisions. '234
The original meaning that Justice Thomas attributes to the Public Use Clause
is in fact just one of several plausible original understandings of the clause that
finds support in history.233 Supreme Court Justices and their clerks simply may
not have the time or the expertise to conduct the time-consuming research
necessary to uncover all the relevant historical sources. Running through
Thomas' Kelo dissent is the widely-held assumption that the Founders' primary
goal in creating the Constitution was to protect individuals' absolute property
rights against government interference. 236 But many Founders subscribed to

republican ideals too, which emphasized the elevation of the public good over the
private interest as critical to the survival of the republican form of government.237

228. Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., I N.J. Eq. 694, 729 (N.J. Ch. 1832) (emphasis added); see
also supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
229. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 513.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 477-83 (majority opinion).
232. Id. at 513 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
233. See supra Part II.
234. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 223.
235. See generally Scheiber, supra note 21.
236. See supra Part III.
237. See supra notes 84-94, 112-20, and accompanying text.
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Readers of Thomas' Kelo dissent ought to keep in mind Harry Scheiber's advice
about relying too heavily on historical analysis for guidance in modem takings
jurisprudence:
If we want to measure contemporary jurisprudential "takings" doctrine
against the values of the past or the historical record of law in action, we
need to recognize that our law has been dualistic and has worked in a
variety of ways-often bewilderingly so. Historically, American
property law has expressed no single orthodoxy of either doctrine or
economic preferences. 3
Because Thomas' search for the original meaning of the Public Use Clause
discounts or ignores all but one of the prominent political beliefs held by the
Founders, his conclusions about the clause's original meaning at best are
embarrassingly inaccurate239 and at worst are purposefully misleading."'

238. Scheiber, supra note 21, at 232.
239. Cf id. at 217 (surmising that those who advocate minimal government intervention, such as
Richard Epstein, "largely block history out of their analyses of property rights and takings" because "the
historical facts regarding eminent domain in national and state constitutional law would prove seriously
embarrassing").
240. See id. at 218 (noting that "little in the actual [historical] record.., will throw even a flimsy mantle
of historical legitimacy over [the] views" of the those who argue that "the pervasive concern of the framers
[was] to protect private rights"); cf ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 7 (criticizing Justice Scalia for "engaging in
historical pretensions" in his opinion for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, in which Scalia
"relied on the supposed existence of a singular American tradition concerning the protection of private
property"); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

